Higher-Order	Memory	Schema	and	Consciousness	Experience The	target	article	makes	a	case	for	Attention	Schema	Theory	(AST),	which	positions attention	schema	as	the	key	for	understanding	consciousness. In	building	their	case, the	authors	distinguish	between	two	novel	terms:	i-consciousness	and	mconsciousness.	They	do	not	make	an	attempt	to	connect	these	new	terms	to established	terms	used	in	consciousness	science,	but	they	do	say	that	iconsciousness	relates	to	information	processing	in	the	brain	whereas	mconsciousness	is	a	mysterious	non-physical	aspect	of	conscious	experiences.	They propose	that	this	aspect	of	m-consciousness	is	a	kind	of	illusion	about consciousness;	the	ghostliness	of	dualism	seems	like	it	is	there	but	is	not. AST	seeks	to	explain	the	ghostly	illusion.	This	makes	their	model	a	version	of	weak illusionism	(Chalmers	2018). The	authors	stress	that	they	do	not	deny	the	existence of	consciousness.	As	they	say,	'someone	is	home,	but	that	someone	is	slightly	misled about	his	or	her	exact	nature'	(p14). Here,	we	think,	the	authors	make	a	fundamental	error.	They	suggest	that	the	notions of	phenomenal	consciousness,	subjective	awareness,	or	what	it	is	like	to	have	a	mental life,	carry	with	them	an	implicit	commitment	to	something	non-physical.	For	them, subjective	experience	refers	to	a	non-physical	property	that	we	do	not	in	fact	have; what	we	have	instead,	are	inaccurate	representations	of	I-consciousness	by attention	schema.	But	if	there	is	indeed	'someone	home'	then	there	is	subjective experience,	and	their	theory	can	be	thought	of	as	an	account	of	that	kind	of phenomenal	consciousness. Although	phenomenal	consciousness	is	sometimes	discussed	in	connection	with dualism	(Nagel	2012),	a	commitment	to	dualism	is	an	extra	theoretical	claim	and	is not	itself	built	into	the	concept	of	phenomenal	consciousness.	Phenomenal consciousness	is	just	experience	and	can	be	characterized	by	what	it	is	like	to	have the	experience. In	fact,	consciousness	science	does	not	seek	to	explain	how	the mind	has	a	non-materialistic	subjective	experience	(p.	12-13).	It	assumes	that	there is	subjective	experience	and	then	looks	for	the	brain	mechanisms	that	correlate	with it	and	-hopefullyultimately	explain	it.	The	authors	seem	to	be	motivated	by	a	need to	provide	an	answer	to	Chalmers'	Meta-Problem	of	consciousness	(Chalmers	2018) but	there	is	some	dispute	about	whether	a	theory	of	consciousness	does	indeed	owe an	explanation	for	why	a	Hard	Problem	of	consciousness	seems	to	exist	(Rosenthal 2019).	Even	if	one	thinks	the	meta-problem	is	one	that	a	theory	of	consciousness should	address,	it	need	not	do	so	by	stipulating	that	the	physical	processes	appealed to	describe	consciousness	explicitly	as	non-physical. In	arguing	their	case,	the	authors	build	on	Global	Workspace	Theory	(GWT)	and Higher-Order	Thought	(HOT)	theory.	Key	to	the	AST	model	is	a	schema	description of	global	workspace	activity.	And	the	illusion	proposed	is	a	higher-order	state,	not unlike	a	metacogntive	state,	that	supplies	content.	They	thus	suggest	that	AST	can be	thought	of	as	a	unification	of	GWT	and	HOT. Their	position	is,	in	some	ways,	a	logical	unification	of	GWT	and	HOT	since proponents	of	both	advocate	the	involvement	of	cognitive	processes	and	prefrontal cortex	(PFC)	in	consciousness	(Lau	and	Rosenthal,	2011;	Baars,	1998;	Dehaene 2014).	For	example,	in	GWT	PFC	is	part	of	a	network	that	ignites	widespread broadcasting	of	information	and	in	HOT	it	contributes	to	phenomenal	content. However,	as	presented,	AST	does	not	accurately	capture	the	essence	of	HOT. For	one	thing,	as	suggested	above	about	physicalist	theories	in	general,	HOT	is	a theory	about	the	nature	of	subjective	experience.	It	is	not	a	theory	of	why	we	merely say	we	have	conscious	experience	(p	15).	Higher-order	theories	argue	that	people do	in	fact	have	physical	(brain	instantiated)	subjective	experiences.	The	authors seem	to	assume	that	HOT	is	a	theory	that	is	by	its	nature	illusionist.	We	see	no reason	to	think	that	higher-order	theory	builds	into	the	higher-order representations	the	assumption	that	consciousness	is	a	mysterious	non-physical property.	Second,	HOT	requires	that	one	be	aware	of	one's	mental	life,	and postulates	that	this	kind	of	inner	awareness	consists	in	a	re-representation	of	what is	occurring	at	the	lower-order	levels.	However,	the	authors	explicitly	deny	that	the attention	schema	involves	re-representing	visual	stimuli	(p	36).	The	attention schema	contains	higher-order	information	in	that	it	is	a	description	of	what	is happening	at	the	highest	levels	of	attentional	processing,	which	they	equate	with being	in	the	global	workspace.	They	add	that	it	offers	a	rough	sketch	that	simplifies what	is	actually	happening	in	the	global	workspace,	but	whatever	the	description	is in	the	attention	schema,	it	does	not	amount	to	the	kind	of	thought-like	awareness required	to	be	aware	of	one's	mental	states,	such	a	proposed	in	HOT. Part	of	the	problem	may	stem	from	a	conflation	of	metacognition	and	higher-order consciousness	(see	Brown	et	al	2019).	They	both	depend	on	some	common	neural mechanisms	involving	PFC	but	are	not	equivalent--a	metacognitive	state	is	not necessarily	what	allows	one	to	know	that	they	are	having	the	experience.	HOT postulates	that	a	specific	kind	of	metacognitive	state,	one	which	results	in	being aware	of	one's	own	mental	life,	is	required	for	conscious	experience.	Many,	if	not most,	metacognitive	states	will	not	result	in	this	kind	of	higher-order	awareness. Typical	metacognition	is	conscious,	in	that	one	is	aware	that	one	is	engaging	in	it, and	effortful.	The	kind	of	higher-order	awareness	appealed	to	here	is	not	something which	one	is	aware	of	engaging	in	and	it	happens	effortlessly	and	automatically. Traditional	HOT	theory	postulates	that	the	way	in	which	we	are	aware	of	our	mental functioning	is	by	automatically	having	a	thought-like,	conceptual	or	intentional, state	with	the	content	that	one	is	in	the	first-order	state.	Ultimately	these representations	are	nothing	but	brain	activity. As	we	read	AST	it	proposes	that	mental	models	based	on	attention	schema	are	what add	the	subjective	quality	to	visual	experience,	albeit	one	which	mis-describes	what is	really	going	on	in	one's	global	workspace. The	authors	recognize	that	other	kinds of	schema	exist,	such	as	decision	and	memory	schema,	but	argue	that	these	are	not as	tightly	correlated	with	consciousness	as	attention,	and	therefore	less	relevant	to consciousness. But	it	is	the	lack	of	an	account	of	the	content	of	experience	by attention	schema	that	limits	what	AST	can	say	about	consciousness.	Perhaps memory	schema	are	what	is	needed. We	have	proposed	versions	of	higher-order	theory	that	emphasize	memory	schema, treating	them	as	lower-order	(non-conscious)	states	that	function	as	templates	that are	pattern-completed	by	physical	and	social	situations	(LeDoux	and	Brown,	2017; LeDoux,	2015,	2019a,	2019b;	Brown	et	al,	2019). Memory	schema,	in	our	model, form	the	basis	for	higher-order	subjective	experiences.	Perhaps	the	non-conscious kind	of	attention	discussed	in	connection	with	AST	is	what	assembles	active	nonconscious	memory	schema,	and	then	additional	attentional	processes	select	from schematic	content	what	we	are	aware	of	in	the	moment.	This,	we	suggest,	would	be a	true	union	of	GWT,	AST	and	higher-order	theory.	GWT	and	AST	provide	crucial accounts	of	how	lower-order	states	are	assembled	and	maintained,	but	higher-order theory	provides	the	account	of	subjective	experience. In	closing	we	note	that	there	is	a	sense	in	which	the	higher-order	theory	we	propose has	elements	of	weak	illusionism,	but	without	ghostly	dualism.	To	know	what	we are	seeing	requires	memory	and	concepts	(which	themselves	are	a	form	of memory). In	our	memory	schema	model,	what	we	see	is	thus	not	what	is	in	the world	but	what	our	schema	tells	us	about	what	is	present.	The	schema	are	nonconscious	mental	models	that	provide	"priors,"	allowing	us	to	use	lower-order information	to	predict	what	is	there	before	the	lower-order	processes	have completed	the	job.	Consciousness,	in	this	perspective,	is	a	memory-based	higherorder	expectation	about	what	is	present	now.	But	a	similar	mechanism,	relying solely	on	memory	rather	than	sensory	information,	can	also	allow	us	to	be	conscious of	what	happened	to	us	in	the	past,	and	what	might	be	headed	our	way	in	our	future. Images,	hallucinations,	thoughts	and	feelings	in	the	absence	of	sensory	support	are physicalist	forms	of	illusion.	But	perhaps	perception	is	as	well	(Clark,	1998;	Frith, 2007;	Lau	and	Brown,	2019). References Baars	BJ	(1988)	A	Cognitive	Theory	of	Consciousness.	New	York:	Cambridge University	Press. Brown, R, Lau, H, and LeDoux JE (2019) Understanding the Higher-Order Approach to Consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Science 23(9). p Pps 754-768. Clark	A	(1998)	Being	There.	Cambridge,	MA:	MIT	Press. Chalmers,	D.	(2018)	The	Meta	Problem	of	Consciousness.	Journal	of	Consciousness Studies,	25,	No.	9–10,	pp.	6–61. Dehaene,	S.	(2014)	Consciousness	and	the	Brain:	Deciphering	How	the	Brain	Codes Our	Thoughts,	Penguin	Books. Frankish	K	(2017)	Illusionism:	as	a	theory	of	consciousness.	Imprint	Academic. Frith	C	(2007)	Making	Up	the	Mind:	How	the	brain	creates	our	mental	world. Malden,	MA:	Blackwell	Publishing. Lau	H,	and	Brown	R	(2019)	The	Emperor's	New	Phenomenology?	The	Empirical Case	for	Conscious	Experience	without	First-Order	Representations.	In:	Blockheads (Pautz,	A.	and	Stoljar,	D.,	eds)	Cambridge,	MA:	MIT	Press. Lau,	H.	and	Rosenthal,	D.	(2011)	Empirical	support	for	higher-order	theories	of conscious	awareness.	Trends	Cogn.	Sci.	15,	365–373. LeDoux,	JE	(2015)	Anxious:	Using	the	brain	to	understand	and	treat	fear	and anxiety.	New	York:	Viking. LeDoux,	JE	(2019a)	The	Deep	History	of	Ourselves:	The	four-billion-year	story	of how	we	got	conscious	brains.	New	York:	Viking. LeDoux,	JE	(2019b)	An	Emotion	Is....	Pyschology	Today. https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/i-got-mind-tell-you/201911/emotion-is LeDoux, JE and Brown, R (2017) A Higher-Order Theory of Emotional Consciousness. Proceedings	of	the	National	Academy	of	Sciences	of	the	United	States	114(10): E2016-E2025. Nagel,	T	(2012).	Mind	and	Cosmos:	Why	the	Materialist	Neo-Darwinian	Conception of	Nature	Is:	Why	the	Materialist	Neo-Darwinian	Conception	of	Nature	is	Almost Certainly	False.	Oxford	University	Press	USA. Rosenthal,	D	(2019)	"Chalmers'	Meta	Problem"	Journal	of	Consciousness	Studies,	26, No.	9–10,	pp.	194–204.